I have mixed feelings on this topic.
On one hand I see on a daily basis a lot of investors opening a new position “because such-and-such influencer said so” or “because this head-and-shoulders pattern is going to make me rich” without even opening an annual report or doing the slightest homework on these companies.
I kind of like this competition because, investing being a game of luck and skill, in the long term all the luck cancels out and most of them are going to the slaughterhouse.
That’s probably why the general position of this forum is “active investors are just losers that will just take a lot of fees for nothing”. And in a lot of cases, that’s true.
But I also know many good investors who like to stay out of the spotlights with very good track records.
I was attending last Monday a workshop by Joel Cohen from Mitimco (one of the capital allocators responsible for allocating the funds of the MIT endowment), and around 25 such emerging fund managers attended.
I found several patterns about them
- Most of them don’t want at all retail investor money. When you have a superior track record, you have the luxury of vetting your investor base, and the last thing they want is to have retail investors that will panic at the first drawdown, withdrawing their money and monopolizing the fund manager’s attention exactly at the periods when the best opportunities arise. One of the questions I heard being asked is “During the Covid panic in March 2020, were you a capital provider or a capital redeemer?”.
As a rule of thumb, if a fund is marketed toward retail investors, it is more probable that the goal is asset gathering (generating fees) rather than investment performance.
- Fee Structure: One very interesting thing about good capital allocators is that if they think that a manager is above average, then they want the fees to be structured in such a way that over the long term there is a reasonable expectation that half of the overperformance will go to the investor, and half will go to the manager. In particular, allocators were adamant in saying that the popular 2 and 20 structure (used by a lot of hedge funds) is completely wrong, because over time most of the overperformance goes to the manager. To give an idea of what is fair, they gave an example of a manager doing 15%/year, and charging 1% management fees, and 10% peformance fees over a 6% annual highwatermark.
- Most of them had a good game selection (i.e, where are they likely to find the most opportunities?) For instance, some of them would restrict the maximum capital invested to a limit to stay small and keep investing in micro cap where competition from institutional investors is absent. Other would be hyper-specialized in a given sector structurally innefficient like biotechs: most investors stay away from biotech and financial companies because they are very hard to analyze and require a very specific knowledge.
I will end with a quote from Joel Cohen on Active vs Passive:
On passive vs active investing
I mean, I think the key to answering that question is, is it possible to have a sustainable competitive advantage in investing that allows you to outperform passive indices and generate great absolute returns over a long period of time? We still think that it is, and we see a lot of evidence of that in our portfolio and the managers we work with.
I think there’s no question that the investment industry has gotten more competitive, and certain advantages that you could have had 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 30 years ago, in terms of just like, knowing more about a company than other people or sort of having an advantage in figuring out what’s going to happen in the next quarter or the next year. That is an advantage that you could have probably had 20 years ago, and some people built a track record on that, that edge seems to have been competed away.
So I think the question for us is, are there other competitive advantages that you can build? And we think that there are.
I think the most notable one is that human behavior hasn’t changed a lot. We still are subject to the same types of biases, probably new biases. Humans are still naturally short sighted and have a very difficult time taking the five or 10 year view. And very few people take the time to build their business in such a way that they can take their five or 10 year view. And in our mind, that’s competitive advantage that’s not–doesn’t seem to be competed away, and maybe even is growing. And so we still actively allocate our entire portfolio.
But we’re also mindful that it’s gotten more competitive. And it’s harder to have the same kind of performance that people have had in the past. And so we always want to be looking back and sort of thinking about—are the things that were the case in the past still true today? And should we be thinking about having a passive allocation? But many still feel like the very best of the best investment managers can still generate outstanding, absolute relative performance.